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Resumo
Este artigo analisa o impacto do Mercosul sobre o bem-estar de seus membros e não-membros
e a existência de criação ou desvio de comércio através do modelo de equilíbrio geral
computável GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project). As simulações examinam os efeitos do
bloco entre 1991 e 1995 e o provável resultado da implementação da tarifa externa comum
(TEC) em 2006. Os resultados mostram que para todos os membros do Mercosul o impacto
da convergência à TEC é muito menor do que aquele observado durante a liberalização
comercial intra-bloco entre 1991 e 1995.
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Abstract
This paper relies on a computable general equilibrium model from the Global Trade Analysis
Project (GTAP) to infer directly the impact of Mercosur on welfare in both members and non-
member countries and also the existence of trade creation and trade diversion. The
simulations examine the effects of the free trade area between 1991 and 1995 and the likely
outcome of the establishment of the custom union arising from the implementation of the
common external tariff in 2006. The results show that for all bloc members the impact of
convergence to the CET is much smaller than that observed under regional liberalization
between 1991 and 1995.
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1.  Introduction
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have been widely employed to evaluate the
impact of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) on both members and non-member countries. They
allow estimation of welfare changes associated with preferential reductions in the protection structure,
covering both static and dynamics effects of integration. Potential static gains arise from the specialisation
of production according to comparative advantage, changes in terms of trade, improved efficiency due to
increased foreign competition and economies of scale. Dynamic effects refer to changes in the rate of
economic growth. Baldwin and Venables (1995) divide the CGE analysis into three different generations
based on these effects. The first phase is based on a perfect competition framework where no dynamics is
allowed. In this model only static gains associated with better resource allocation and improved terms of
trade take place. The second phase comprises evaluations based on imperfect competition with scale
economies and product differentiation playing an important role in some industrial sectors. The third
phase introduces the effects of integration on saving, investment and economic growth.
An interesting point to note is the apparent trade-off between the magnitude of empirical results
obtained from approaches based on different phases and the confidence in the understanding of these
different effects (e.g. Allen et al., 1996; and Hoekman et al., 1998). On the one hand the size of results of
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approaches based on scale, competition and growth are greater than the gains obtained by models based
on static efficiency and terms of trade changes. On the other hand, models based on perfect competition
involve policy changes of known magnitude and robust analytical methods, while models from the second
and third generation involve inference from a body of theory with plenty of controversy in relation to
issues such as the extent of scale economies and the estimation of price-cost margins in imperfectly
competitive industries.
Despite the lack of confidence in the way the imperfect competition models are formulated and
the need for further information, these models have been widely employed to deal with the impact of
economic integration on member and non-member countries, due to evidence that some sectors
experience increasing returns to scale at the plant or firm level. The CGE literature shows that welfare
gains are usually larger using imperfect competition models compared to perfect competition models in
studies analyzing NAFTA (e.g. Roland-Horst et al., 1992; Brown et al., 1992), the EU (e.g. Harrison et
al., 1994; Haaland and Norman, 1992) the FTAA (e.g. Valls Pereira, 2000; Watanaki and Monteagudo,
2001; Diao et al., 2002) and Mercosur (e.g. Flores, 1996; Cavalcante and Mercenier, 1999) as the former
create additional mechanisms through which a PTA can affect welfare. However, theory neither says that
overall gains are necessarily greater in an imperfectly competitive framework nor that they change in the
same direction. Harrison et al. (1997), for instance, stress that these larger gains are usually associated
with high mark-ups and/or incorporation of other changes, such as elasticities, rather than change in the
regime itself. As a result, this paper uses the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, based on
perfect competition and constant returns to scale, to perform an applied general equilibrium evaluation of
welfare and trade pattern changes in both members and non-member countries caused by Mercosur
formation.
Two sets of simulations are performed. The first set deals with an analysis of changes in tariffs
from 1991 to 1995, and seeks to distinguish the effects of the preferential trade liberalization under the
auspices of Mercosur and the unilateral measures adopted simultaneously by its members. This set
consists of two experiments. Initially intra-bloc tariffs are eliminated while tariffs on imports from third
countries are maintained. Then these results are compared with those obtained from trade liberalization on
a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) basis assuming that the difference between these two simulations will
represent the effective role played by the preferential agreement. The isolation of the effects that could be
attributed exclusively to the bloc formation showed that most of allocative gains observed under the
preferential experiment stemmed from external rather than internal liberalization. The second set of
simulations examines the implementation of the common external tariff (CET) on imports from third
countries in 2006, starting with the preferential situation in 1995. The results show that for all bloc
members the impact of convergence to the CET is much smaller than that observed under regional
liberalization between 1991 and 1995.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the regional and sectoral aggregation
chosen for all simulations and the economy in the initial equilibrium in 1995. The details of the
experiments, with emphasis on direction and magnitude of tariff changes as a result of the simulations are
reported in section three. Section four presents the results stressing trade pattern and welfare
consequences of the integration of Mercosur members. The last section concludes.
2.  Aggregation and the Pre-Simulation Tariffs
GTAP model of global trade (Hertel, 1997) is a standard, multi-region, applied general
equilibrium model that assumes constant returns to scale and perfect competition in production activities.
2
Version 4 of GTAP database (McDougall et al., 1999) discriminates between 45 regions and 50
commodity groups that could be aggregated according to the researcher’s interest. Table 1 shows the
regional and product aggregation used in the experiments. The regions are aggregated into Argentina,
Brazil, Uruguay (separated so as to allow measurement of trade and welfare effects in each of these
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members of the bloc), the EU, NAFTA, the Andean Pact, ASEAN+Japan, and the rest of the world. The
criterion to establish this aggregation selected the members of the bloc and those regions with the larger
trade ties with bloc members.
3 As a result, only about one quarter of trade of each Mercosur member was
made with the rest of the world region. The 50 commodities distinguished in GTAP 4 database were
grouped into 10 aggregates: grains, other agricultural products, livestock, extraction, processed food,
clothing, transport equipment, machinery, other manufactures and services. They were selected by their
importance in terms of trade, bearing in mind the convenience of disaggregating both agricultural
products and manufactures.
Table 1: Regional and Commodity Aggregation
Regional Aggregation Commodity Aggregation
1. Argentina 1. Grains
2. Brazil Paddy rice, wheat, cereal grains nec
3. Uruguay 2. Other Agric. Prods
4. EU
5. NAFTA
Vegetables, fruit, nuts, oil seeds, sugar cane, sugar beet, plant-based
fibers, crops nec
6. ANDEAN PACT 3. Livestock
7. ASEAN+JAPAN
8. ROW
Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses, animal products, raw milk,
wool, silk-worm cocoons
4. Natural Resource, Extractive and related industries
Forestry, fishing, coal, oil, gas, minerals nec, petroleum, coal
products
5. Processed Food
Bovine meat prods, Meat products nec, vegetable oils and fats, dairy
products, processed rice, sugar, food products nec, beverages and
tobacco products
6. Clothing
Textiles and wearing apparel
7. Transport Equipment
Motor vehicles and parts, transport equipment nec
8. Machinery and Electronic Prods
Electronic equipment, machinery and equipment nec
9. Other manufactures
Leather products, wood products, paper products, publishing,
chemical, rubber, plastic products, mineral products nec, ferrous
metals, metals nec, metal products, manufactures nec
10. Services
Electricity, gas manufacture, distribution, water, construction, trade,
transport, financial, business, recreational services, public admin. and
defense, education, health, dwellings & services
       Source: GTAP 4 Database, McDougall et al. (1999)
Before proceeding to the simulations it is worth examining the protection structure in force in the
simulations performed in this paper. Bilateral tariffs at the GTAP level of aggregation are set up by
aggregating applied MFN tariff rates from tariff lines, at HS 06 or 08-digit level, to the GTAP commodity
groups using bilateral import value weights. Thus, the model provides bilateral tariff rates that reflect
composition differences in tariffs and trade in 1995. Positive values represent an import tariff while
negative ones represent an import subsidy. The simulations performed in this paper, however, change the
bilateral weighted tariffs to specific unweighted tariff targets in 1991 and 2006, representing the MFN
tariffs and the CET, respectively. In order to avoid comparisons between two equilibrium generated with
weighted and unweighted imported tariffs it was decided to change the initial equilibrium in 1995,
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adjusting the weighted tariffs to the unweighted tariffs in force in this year.
4 Thus, in all simulations
performed in this paper, the 1995 unweighted tariffs are altered in order to reach a target unweighted
uniform tariff in 1991 (pre-simulation period) and 2006 (implementation of the CET).














Grains 0.00 2.57 0.00 2.57 0.00 2.57
OthAgric 0.00 10.08 0.00 10.29 0.00 10.29
Livestock 0.00 7.67 0.00 7.67 0.00 7.67
Extraction 0.00 8.69 0.00 8.39 0.00 8.42
Food 0.00 9.01 0.00 9.32 0.00 9.00
Cloth 0.00 7.99 0.00 8.12 0.00 7.81
TransEqu 0.00 11.17 0.00 16.73 0.00 5.82
Mach 0.00 10.79 0.00 16.69 0.00 7.62
OthManf 0.00 15.43 0.00 14.55 0.00 14.56
       Source: Author’s own calculations
Table 2 provides the unweighted tariff structure in the initial equilibrium in 1995 that serve as the
basis for the ‘Preferential simulation’, in which intra-bloc preferences are disregarded.
5 As regards the
tariff structure itself, it is possible to observe that in most sectors in 1995 Mercosur members had very
similar, if not identical tariffs, applied on imports from non-member countries, especially in agricultural
products, as a result of the start of tariff convergence to the CET. The differences are more evident in
manufactures, where Brazil applied the highest and Uruguay the lowest tariffs, while Argentina was in an
intermediate situation. In the case of transport equipment, for instance, the Brazilian tariff is about three
times higher than that applied by Uruguay. The difference was also significant in the case of machinery,
in which the Uruguayan tariff was less than half that applied by Brazil. In the remaining manufactures the
differences in tariffs were much smaller. The tariff structure of bloc members is fundamental to
understanding the potentially significant impact on trade patterns and welfare of its members that could
be caused by elimination of intra-bloc tariffs and the changes in extra-bloc tariffs.
3.  The Experiments
The two major phases of Mercosur formation are internal trade liberalization and full
implementation of the CET. The former took place between 1991 and 1994 and was completed at the
beginning of 1995, while the latter was scheduled to happen in 2006.
6 The simulations performed in this
paper seek to capture the effects on trade and welfare in members and non-member countries of Mercosur
caused by each of these different phases of the bloc formation.
7 The GTAP 4 database is quite useful for
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regional composition of global capital stocks is left unaltered (rordelta=0). Rordelta is a binary coefficient, which determines
the mechanism of allocating investment funds across regions, which assumes the value of zero (fixed regional composition)
and one (rate of return component). Since the objective is to measure the effects of Mercosur formation, the experiments
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the problem in hand, since it generates its benchmark equilibrium for 1995, the year in which the intra-
bloc duty-free started. Then based on this 1995 equilibrium it would be possible to back cast for 1991
using the tariffs in force in that year allowing us to estimate the impact of the creation of free trade based
solely on internal liberalization. On the other hand starting with the initial equilibrium in 1995 it would be
possible to measure the effects exclusive to the implementation of the CET in 2006.
However, two problems mean the procedure is not as simple as it seems at the first glance. The
first is that although, in principle, GTAP 4 database adjusts the protection data imposing zero import duty
and export subsidy rates within free trade areas for generating the benchmark equilibrium in 1995, this
version only recognizes four FTAs in that year not including Mercosur.
8 As a result, in the GTAP
database all commodity groups face either a tariff or a subsidy in intra-Mercosur trade. Thus while trade
data reflects preferences the policy data (tariff + subsidies) do not. Thus it is necessary to make them
consistent. In order to adjust the protection data, eliminating all tariffs within the bloc and changing the
members’ external protection structure in order to reach a uniform unweighted import tariff, the ‘Altertax’
simulation was used.
9 This adjustment in intra and extra-bloc tariff rates represents the modified initial
equilibrium for the first simulation performed in this paper. In order to measure the impact of intra-bloc
trade liberalization a back cast simulation was initially performed applying the unweighted import tariff
in force in 1991 for all regions, creating the ‘Preferential experiment’ (PRF).
10 However, there is another
problem with this simulation not related with the GTAP database. The problem is that tariff changes
implemented in this simulation capture both unilateral trade liberalization of the early 1990s, adopted on a
MFN basis, and preferential measures adopted to liberalize intra-Mercosur trade in the same period. Thus,
it would not be possible to distinguish Mercosur effects from the unilateral measures undertaken by each
individual member of the bloc. In order to disentangle the bloc effects from the unilateral measures, a
second simulation was performed. In this experiment, both members and non-member countries face the
same 1995 unweighted MFN tariffs and again a back cast, based on the unweighted MFN import tariff in
force in 1991, was performed generating the ‘Multilateral experiment’ (MFN). This seeks to capture the
impact provoked by non-discriminatory changes in tariffs from 1991 to 1995. The difference between the
Preferential and the Multilateral experiments will then represent the actual impact of the bloc on trade
patterns and welfare.
Table 3: Situation of Import Tariffs by Experiment
Experiments Members Non-Members
Pre-Simulation Post-Simulation Pre-Simulation Post-Simulation
Altertax 1995 GTAP zero 1995 GTAP 1995 MFN
PRF zero 1991 MFN 1995 MFN 1991 MFN
MFN 1995 MFN 1991 MFN 1995 MFN 1991 MFN
CET zero zero 1995 MFN 2006 CET
The second set of simulations seeks to capture the effects attributed exclusively to introduction of
the CET in 2006. The ‘CET experiment’ starts from the same 1995 modified equilibrium as the ‘PRF
experiment’, with intra-bloc free trade and the unweighted tariff applied only on imports from non-
member countries created by the ‘Altertax’ program. Thus, while the first set of simulations measured the
impact of internal trade liberalization, which occurred between 1991 and 1995, the second set estimates
the effects of formation of the customs union scheduled for 2006, completing the effects of the customs
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union. Table 3 reports the tariffs in place in members and non-member countries in both the pre and post-
simulations. It can be seen that the only, and fundamental, difference between the PRF and the MFN
experiments is that in the latter bloc members also face the MFN 1995 tariffs instead of free trade.
Previous attempts to assess the impact of Mercosur on trade pattern and welfare based on GTAP version 3
started with a benchmark equilibrium for 1989 (e.g., Brandão et al., 1998; and Ferreira Filho, 1999)
estimating the impact of the free trade area and the customs union together, not investigating the specific
effects generated by each one of these two phases of integration. As a result, although those authors
recognized the problem, much of the ‘Mercosur effect’ captured by those estimates would be due to the
unilateral dimension of the countries’ trade policies.















Grains -5.00 -2.43 -14.29 -11.71 -13.50 -10.93
OthAgric -5.44 4.64 -14.44 -4.15 -15.71 -5.42
Livestock -7.80 -0.13 -9.28 -1.61 -17.41 -9.74
Extraction -4.95 3.74 -7.44 0.96 -14.37 -5.96
Food -7.46 1.55 -24.95 -15.63 -20.45 -11.44
Cloth -19.13 -11.14 -38.84 -30.72 -12.85 -5.04
TransEqu -15.83 -4.66 -37.83 -21.10 -15.74 -9.92
Mach -13.02 -2.23 -31.42 -14.73 -17.09 -9.47
OthManf -12.30 3.14 -21.69 -7.14 -16.93 -2.38
Services -10.00 -10.00 10.00 -10.00 10.00 -10.00
     Source: Author’s own calculations
     /1: represent the changes in import tariffs between 1991 and 1995.
Under the ‘Preferential experiment’, all intra-bloc tariffs were eliminated, leading clothing,
transport equipment and machinery to experience the largest reductions in intra-bloc tariffs in both
Argentina and Brazil, reflecting the higher tariffs applied on these sectors in 1991 (table 4). However,
besides pursuing regional liberalization, Mercosur members, especially Brazil, also followed a unilateral
trade liberalization that provoked a sharp decline in import tariffs from non-member countries as well.
Therefore, third countries were also facing, in almost all sectors, lower tariffs in 1995 than they were in
1991, reducing to some extent the preferential margin stemming from internal liberalization. The
Brazilian preferential tariff reduction, for instance, exceeded 30 percentage points in all three sectors
mentioned above, although tariffs also went down significantly in imports coming from outside the bloc.
The only sector in which Brazil increased its level of protection towards non-member countries was
extraction. In Argentina, which had a lower import tariff in 1991 compared to the other members of the
bloc, some sectors, such as other agricultural products and extraction, faced a reduction in intra-bloc
tariffs along with an increase in extra-bloc tariffs creating the prospect of trade diversion. The unilateral
dismantling of tariff barriers was also a feature of Uruguayan trade policy. In most sectors extra-bloc
tariffs declined between 1991 and 1995 with the highest fall, above 11 percentage points, occurring in
processed food. Meanwhile, in the ‘MFN experiment’, changes in tariffs applied on imports from non-
member countries are the same as in the ‘Preferential experiment’ but now intra-bloc tariffs are also
altered in the same way rather than reduced to zero.
In the ‘CET experiment’ internal tariffs are kept constant at zero and tariffs on imports coming
from outside the bloc change from their 1995 level in order to converge to the CET (table 5). The
implementation of the CET causes small differences in the pattern of tariff changes, since Mercosur
members already presented a quite similar tariff structure in the base-year of 1995. The major exceptions
are transport equipment and machinery, in which Brazil has a downward convergence to the CET while
Argentina and Uruguay have to increase their tariffs, especially the latter. Brazil, in fact, is the country
that most often has to reduce its tariffs in order to adjust them to the CET, reflecting its higher level of7
protection in 1995. The CET structure concedes a higher level of protection to manufactures, noticeably
clothing, transport equipment and machinery, while all agricultural sectors face import tariffs not
exceeding one digit. The significant increase in tariffs applied on imports of clothing in all members of
the bloc that reached almost 10 percentage points are noteworthy, making this sector the most protected in
Mercosur.
















Grains 0.00 2.83 0.00 2.83 0.00 2.83 5.40
OthAgric 0.00 -2.76 0.00 -2.97 0.00 -2.97 7.32
Livestock 0.00 -2.68 0.00 -2.68 0.00 -2.68 4.99
Extraction 0.00 -4.82 0.00 -4.52 0.00 -4.55 3.87
Food 0.00 3.25 0.00 2.94 0.00 3.26 12.26
Cloth 0.00 9.57 0.00 9.44 0.00 9.75 17.56
TransEqu 0.00 3.50 0.00 -2.06 0.00 8.85 14.67
Mach 0.00 2.07 0.00 -3.83 0.00 5.24 12.86
OthManf 0.00 -5.76 0.00 -4.88 0.00 -4.89 9.67
Services 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Source: Author’s own calculations
/1: represent the changes in import tariffs between 1995 and 2006.
4.  Results
The results focus mainly on the quantification of trade creation and trade diversion effects, based
on an apparent consumption analysis, and welfare changes associated with them due to formation of the
free trade area in 1995 and the implementation of the customs union in 2006. Trade creation is expected
to have a positive effect on welfare of bloc members, since abolition of tariffs in intra-bloc trade allows
bloc members to allocate their resources more efficiently in production, enabling them to import goods,
substituting away from inefficient domestic producers. In contrast, trade diversion is likely to have a
negative impact on welfare since a member of the bloc replaces more efficient producers located outside
the bloc.
4.1 Preferential Liberalisation (PRF)
The CGE model allows us to obtain both imports and domestic production and, more importantly,
permit one to calculate the impact on welfare. With imports and domestic output it is possible to identify
directly the extent of trade creation and trade diversion under the apparent consumption analysis, which
allows the division of demand into three different sources: domestic production net of exports (P-X),
imports from bloc members (Mi) and from outside the bloc (Mw). This approach has been widely used to
analyze the effects of trade creation and trade diversion, as a result of a PTA (e.g. Truman, 1975;
Jacquemin and Sapir, 1988). Truman (1975) nominates 6 possible configurations arising from changes in
the shares of the three sources of supply as a result of the establishment of a PTA (table 6). Cases 1,2 and
3 involve trade creation and are associated with a decline in the domestic share along with a higher
dependency on imports. If this decline is soaked up by both intra-bloc and extra-bloc imports it
constitutes case 1, known as internal and external trade creation.
11 If, however, the fall in domestic
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production is entirely absorbed by imports from outside or inside the bloc, it corresponds to cases 2 and 3,
respectively. Cases 4, 5 and 6 are associated with trade diversion, where the share of domestic production
increases to the detriment of intra-bloc imports and/or imports from non-member countries. These
situations can arise especially when tariffs on imports coming from outside the bloc are raised.
Table 7 shows that, in almost every case, the share of imports from bloc members increases at the
expense of either domestic production or imports from the rest of the world or both. In the case of Brazil,
in most sectors the increase in the share of intra-bloc imports in apparent consumption is accompanied by
a rise in the share of imports from outside the bloc to the detriment of domestic production, characterizing
so-called external and internal trade creation. This resulted from a sharp increase in the volume of imports
from both sources, rather than from a decline in output. Interestingly, the increase in the share of total
imports from non-member countries exceeded that observed in the share of total intra-bloc imports due to
performance of machinery, transport equipment and clothing. The only sector in which trade diversion is
likely to occur is extraction, since the share of intra-bloc imports and domestic production rises at the
expense of imports from outside the bloc.
Table 6: Effects of Economic Integration
Possible Effects (P-X) M
i M
w
1. Internal and external trade creation - + +
2. External trade creation and internal trade diversion - - +
3. Internal trade creation and external trade diversion - + -
4. External trade diversion and external trade erosion + + -
5. External and internal trade erosion + - -
6. Internal trade diversion and internal trade erosion + - +
    Source: Truman (1975)
With regards to Argentina and Uruguay, the rapid growth in volume of imports from within the
bloc not only reduced extra-bloc imports but also led to a decline in domestic production. As a result, in
contrast with changes in Brazil’s apparent consumption, in both Argentina and Uruguay the expansion of
intra-bloc shares observed in most sectors occurred at expense of both domestic production and imports
from non-member countries, creating a situation known as internal trade creation and external trade
diversion. In most sectors in which this phenomenon was present, the bulk of the increase in the share of
intra-bloc imports occurred at the expense of the share of domestic production rather than the share of
imports from outside the bloc, reducing the likelihood of trade diversion. However, in some sectors, such
as other agricultural products, extraction and other manufactures in Argentina and extraction and
transport equipment in Uruguay, most of the expansion of the intra-bloc shares occurred to the detriment
of non-member countries’ imports, increasing the likelihood of trade diversion. As Brazil dominates the
level of trade and production within the bloc, the overall change in shares is extremely similar to that seen
in Brazil, with the share of imports from within and outside the bloc increasing by 0.38 and 0.26
percentage points, respectively, at expense of domestic production.
The foregoing analysis shows a clear dissociation in the way bloc members were allocating their
expenditures. On the one hand, Brazil’s expenditure became more devoted to goods coming from both
members and non-member countries and less devoted to goods produced at home. On the other hand,
although the smaller partners also dedicated a larger share of their expenditures to goods imported from
within the bloc, in most cases they did it at expense of either imports from outside the bloc or domestic
production or even both. While the generalized internal and external trade creation in Brazil is likely to
produce allocative efficiency gains, the same cannot be said about some sectors in the smaller members of
the bloc, where external trade diversion dominates internal trade creation.
Besides of just identifying the direction of welfare changes by each sector in each member of the
bloc, it is also possible to measure it using the GTAP’s welfare decomposition. In a comparative static
model with fixed endowments and technology, the only way to increase welfare is by reducing the excess
burden caused by existing distortions with changes in allocative efficiency resulting from the interaction9
between tax and quantity changes.
12 However, welfare effects are not restricted to allocative changes but
also include changes in terms of trade and changes in relative prices of savings and investment. The terms
of trade (TOT) are defined as the ratio of the price received for tradeables to the price paid for them.
13
The impact on welfare, derived from the investment-savings component (I-S) depends on price of savings
and investment and whether the region is either a net supplier or a net receiver of savings.
14 The regions
that are net suppliers of savings to the global bank benefit from an increase in price of savings relative to
investment goods, while net receivers lose.
15
Table 7: Changes in Share of Apparent Consumption (%)
ARG BRA URY MERC
Sectors Mi Mw P-X Mi Mw P-X Mi Mw P-X Mi Mw P-X
Grains 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.85 0.28 -1.12 0.68 0.38 -1.06 0.65 0.22 -0.87
OthAgr 0.30 -0.27 -0.03 0.23 -0.11 -0.12 3.46 -0.81 -2.66 0.27 -0.15 -0.12
Livestock 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.92 0.08 -1.00 0.08 -0.03 -0.05
Extraction 0.47 -0.55 0.08 0.55 -1.49 0.94 4.33 -2.38 -1.95 0.58 -1.23 0.65
Food 0.19 -0.10 -0.09 0.44 0.24 -0.68 1.69 0.41 -2.10 0.39 0.12 -0.51
Cloth 0.51 0.32 -0.83 0.40 1.20 -1.60 4.75 -0.71 -4.04 0.48 0.89 -1.37
Transp 3.44 -0.72 -2.72 2.63 4.07 -6.69 19.01 -14.97 -4.04 3.09 2.29 -5.38
Mach 2.34 -0.68 -1.66 0.53 2.49 -3.03 7.54 -3.71 -3.83 0.98 1.83 -2.81
OthMnf 1.07 -0.78 -0.29 0.22 0.12 -0.34 6.32 -3.11 -3.21 0.51 -0.15 -0.36
Svces 0.10 0.39 -0.49 0.00 0.16 -0.17 0.02 0.76 -0.77 0.02 0.22 -0.24
Total 0.65 -0.10 -0.55 0.25 0.39 -0.64 2.23 -0.42 -1.81 0.38 0.26 -0.64
  Source: GTAP PRF simulation
Efficiency gains are closely related to the extent to which a country reduces its tariffs. Cheaper
imported products provoke gains in both consumption and in the way the domestic resources are
employed. Table 8 provides a decomposition of allocative efficiency effects by commodity group for each
region. Not surprisingly, the results confirm that Brazil, which reduced its tariffs more aggressively, is the
member of the bloc that benefits most from allocative gains under the ‘PRF experiment’, being
responsible for the bulk of allocative gains when all regions are considered, US$ 3,793 million out of US$
4,277 million. Brazil experiences welfare gains over all commodity groups with the exception of
extraction, as the apparent consumption analysis predicted. Machinery and transport equipment are those
sectors with the highest welfare gains. Machinery alone was responsible for almost a third of total
allocative gains, which exceeded US$ 1,100 million. Conversely, Argentina and Uruguay show a
negligible change in welfare due to the allocative effect, with losses concentrated mostly on those sectors
in which trade diversion dominated in the apparent consumption analysis, such as clothing in Uruguay
and other manufactures in Argentina. All non-members of the bloc also experience allocative gains,
although they were very small, with the EU showing the largest one in absolute terms.
When terms of trade, and savings and investments effects are taken into account, the picture
changes significantly (table 9). The terms of trade component dominates aggregate welfare changes for all
regions but Brazil, which in turn faces a sharp deterioration in its terms of trade component, partially
offsetting allocative gains. This results mainly from a fall in Brazil’s export prices relative to other
regions. The large tariff cuts promoted by Brazil increased the demand for imports from all regions,
creating two effects. On the one hand, the need to raise exports, to pay for the increase in imports, caused
Brazil’s supply prices to fall. On the other hand, other regions, including Argentina and Uruguay, benefit
                                                
12 The regional household’s EV reflects the difference between the expenditure required to obtain the new level of utility at
initial prices (YEV) and that level of utility available at the initial equilibrium (Y), that is to say EV= YEV –Y.
13 McDougall (1993) shows that the change in terms of trade can be decomposed into three terms representing the contribution
of world price indexes of all sectors, regional export and import prices.
14 The closure adopted in all simulations (NewMRGE), where price of savings vary by region, minimizes the difference
between price of investment and savings, making them move closer to each other so as to reflect the fact that the majority of
savings are invested domestically.
15 The EU, Asean and RoW are net suppliers of savings while the remaining regions are net receivers.10
from the higher Brazilian demand for their products bidding up their export prices, leading those regions
to experience an improvement in their terms of trade. As a result, the aggregate welfare effect becomes
positive in these countries.
16 When aggregate welfare gains are scaled by regions’ GDP, all members of
Mercosur share approximately the same gain, around 0.2% of their respective GDPs. Meanwhile, the
outside regions experience a negligible improvement in their welfare, never exceeding 0.03% of their
GDPs.
Table 8:  Decomposition of Regional Allocative Efficiency (1995 US$ million)
Sector Arg Bra Ury NAFTA EU Andean Asean ROW Total
Grains 21 57 1 -4 -4 1 -6 0 66
OthAgr -2 267 1 15 18 0 -6 17 309
Livestock 0 3 2 1 12 0 0 1 20
Extraction -4 -6 2 -7 -27 -1 -8 -27 -78
Food 6 452 20 10 37 0 22 23 569
Cloth 26 381 -16 8 9 1 1 15 425
Transp 30 906 -1 7 27 3 3 27 1,002
Mach 15 1,180 2 10 14 6 5 23 1,255
OthMnf -46 509 7 13 4 5 -24 -5 462
Svces 39 45 -7 64 38 2 26 39 246
Total 85 3,793 13 116 129 17 13 112 4,277
Source: GTAP PRF simulation
The welfare analysis showed that, although Brazil benefits most from the PRF experiment in
absolute terms due to allocative gains resulting from external and internal trade creation, it is not possible
to infer whether it was caused by the unilateral reduction in import tariffs or whether is was provoked by
regional integration per se. Argentina and Uruguay in turn experienced almost no change in welfare due
to the allocative effect, confirming the mixed picture detected in the apparent consumption analysis,
where in most sectors the share of intra-bloc imports went up at the cost of both imports from outside the
bloc and domestic production. However, while Brazil suffered welfare losses stemming from the
deterioration in its terms of trade, this component was responsible for most of the Argentinean and
Uruguayan welfare gains. In order to examine what was the role played by regional integration it is
necessary to isolate its effects from unilateral measures adopted simultaneously by Mercosur members.
The next section does so by estimating what would have happened to bloc trade patterns and welfare if
internal tariffs were not eliminated, but rather they had followed the same evolution of MFN tariffs.











Arg 85 400 2 487 0.187%
Bra 3,793 -2,093 -498 1,202 0.171%
Ury 13 42 -16 38 0.220%
NAFTA 116 421 174 710 0.009%
EU 129 604 88 821 0.010%
Andean 17 30 4 50 0.022%
Asean 13 343 133 489 0.009%
ROW 112 298 124 534 0.010%
Total 4,277 45 11 4,333 0.015%
Source: GTAP PRF simulation
                                                
16 In relation to the savings-investment component only Brazil suffers a major lost in welfare, since it is a net receiver of
savings and the price of regional savings increased relative to investment goods.11
4.2 MFN Liberalisation
The main objective in performing an experiment in which tariffs are changed on a MFN basis is to
create an anti-monde for the actual preferential liberalization that took place among Mercosur members,
allowing the separating out of the effects due to the bloc formation and the unilateral liberalization. In the
MFN simulation import tariffs applied on non-member countries are modified in the same way they were
in the PRF experiment but now the members of the bloc lose their preferential rates, and face the same
1995 tariffs applied on non-member countries. So, the difference between the results from these two
experiments represents the impact that can be attributed exclusively to the bloc formation that will be
detailed in section 4.3.
Table 10 shows changes in apparent consumption due to the MFN experiment. Although there is
no way to evaluate the existence of either trade creation or trade diversion based on trade liberalization
undertaken on a non-discriminatory basis, it serves as a parameter to compare with the PRF experiment.
The main point to notice is that the share of total extra-bloc imports in apparent consumption goes up in
all Mercosur members, reflecting the increase in the value of imports. Once again in Brazil, in most of the
sectors, the share of imports from members and non-member countries increase at the expense of
domestic production. However, now the increase in the shares of extra-bloc imports largely exceeds the
rise in the shares of intra-bloc imports. In the case of transport equipment, for instance, the share of
imports from outside the bloc in apparent consumption went up by 4.67 percentage points, while the share
of intra-bloc trade increased by only a quarter of that value. In Uruguay, the expansion of extra-bloc
shares is also a feature of most sectors, although they cannot catch up with the dynamism presented by the
shares of intra-bloc imports. In Argentina it is also possible to note that, in all commodity groups, the
performance of the shares of intra-bloc imports in comparison with the extra-bloc imports is not as
impressive as it was under the PRF scenario, with the former usually expanding less while the latter
increases more or, at least, declines less.
Table 10: Changes in Shares of Apparent Consumption (%)
ARG BRA URY MERC
Sectors Mi Mw P-X Mi Mw P-X Mi Mw P-X Mi Mw P-X
Grains 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.63 0.33 -0.96 0.47 0.34 -0.81 0.48 0.26 -0.74
OthAgr 0.05 -0.15 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.04 0.14 -1.18 0.02 -0.04 0.02
Livestock 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.50 0.14 -0.64 0.01 -0.01 0.00
Extraction 0.05 -0.50 0.44 -0.12 -1.16 1.28 0.71 0.16 -0.87 -0.06 -0.95 1.01
Food 0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.20 0.33 -0.54 0.78 0.55 -1.33 0.16 0.20 -0.37
Cloth 0.30 0.35 -0.65 0.27 1.23 -1.51 1.91 0.17 -2.08 0.30 0.93 -1.23
Transp 1.71 -0.13 -1.59 1.15 4.67 -5.82 9.80 -7.27 -2.53 1.45 2.95 -4.40
Mach 0.89 -0.12 -0.77 0.12 2.61 -2.73 3.06 -0.26 -2.80 0.32 2.06 -2.37
OthMnf 0.18 -0.46 0.28 0.02 0.19 -0.21 0.97 -0.31 -0.66 0.07 0.01 -0.09
Svces 0.10 0.34 -0.44 0.01 0.15 -0.16 0.02 0.61 -0.63 0.02 0.20 -0.22
Total 0.24 0.01 -0.25 0.08 0.45 -0.53 0.73 0.24 -0.98 0.13 0.34 -0.47
  Source: GTAP MFN simulation
The overall allocative gains obtained under the MFN scenario are only slightly smaller than those
observed under the PRF experiment, reaching US$ 3,975 million (table 11). This denotes that the bulk of
allocative gains obtained under the PRF scenario cannot be attributed to the bloc formation but seem to be
the result of the unilateral tariff reduction undertaken by the bloc members. Brazil remains the only
member of the bloc that largely benefits from allocative gains under the MFN experiment. Brazil
experience welfare losses in only two sectors, extraction and livestock, while the sectors that experience
the largest welfare gains are still the same (machinery and transport equipment). However, overall
allocative gains are about 10% smaller under the MFN scenario when compared with the PRF
experiment, being spread over most sectors. This reflects the fact that opportunities for intra-bloc trade
were reduced, as bloc members were facing higher distortions in the form of import tariffs. Like in the
PRF simulation, Argentina and Uruguay show much smaller allocative gains with welfare losses12
concentrated basically in the same sectors. Non-members of the bloc also experience very small welfare
gains, with the EU once more showing the largest gains in absolute terms.
Table 11: Decomposition of Regional Allocative Efficiency (1995 US$ million)
Sector Arg Bra Ury NAFTA EU Andean Asean ROW Total
Grains 19 43 1 -2 6 0 -3 -3 61
OthAgr -1 122 1 17 22 0 -6 14 168
Livestock 0 -2 1 2 16 0 0 2 19
Extraction -5 -17 2 -6 -27 0 -8 -21 -82
Food 3 389 15 13 90 1 22 31 563
Cloth 27 370 -13 9 11 1 1 16 421
Transp 52 925 3 9 31 3 7 31 1,063
Mach 20 1,097 3 12 17 7 7 25 1,188
OthMnf -36 352 5 18 12 6 -22 9 344
Svces 36 39 -5 60 38 2 24 37 231
Total 115 3,317 12 130 214 21 23 142 3,975
   Source: GTAP MFN simulation
While the allocative effect contributes marginally to the improvement of total welfare under the
MFN simulation, Argentina and Uruguay experience a quite dramatic reduction in gains obtained from
terms of trade in comparison with the ‘PRF experiment’ (table 12). Although Argentina still benefits from
an improvement in its terms of trade, it is much smaller than under the ‘PRF experiment’. In the case of
Argentina, the improvement in terms of trade reached US$ 156 million in comparison with US$ 400
million obtained under the PRF simulation, while Uruguay experienced deterioration in its terms of trade.
As a result, aggregate welfare gains for these two countries were sharply reduced to about 0.1% of GDP
in the case of Argentina, becoming negative in Uruguay. The change in Brazil’s terms of trade and
investment-savings components were very small leading to a decline in aggregate welfare gains mostly
provoked by smaller allocative gains. Welfare gains obtained by the outside regions are still dominated by
the improvement in their terms of trade, with the EU showing the largest increase in this component in
comparison with the PRF experiment.









Arg 115 156 1 272 0.104%
Bra 3,317 -2,169 -519 629 0.089%
Ury 12 -10 -22 -19 -0.110%
NAFTA 130 469 205 804 0.010%
EU 214 747 84 1,046 0.013%
Andean 21 51 4 76 0.033%
Asean 23 392 129 544 0.010%
ROW 142 412 130 684 0.013%
Total 3,975 49 12 4,036 0.014%
Source: GTAP MFN simulation
4.3 Net Effects of The Bloc
The previous analysis showed the effects of a trade policy based on both a discriminatory and a
MFN liberalization on apparent consumption and welfare. It suggested that Mercosur members in general
became much more receptive to imports from outside the bloc and less receptive to imports from within
the bloc under the MFN experiment when compared with the PRF simulation. The objective of this
section is to quantify these differences in order to estimate in which sectors trade diversion dominates,13
and where trade creation is more likely to occur, due to the ‘net Mercosur effect’, computed as the
difference between the PRF and the MFN experiments.
Table 13: Mercosur Effect on Share of Apparent Consumption (%)
/1
ARG BRA URY MERC
Sectors Mi Mw P-X Mi Mw P-X Mi Mw P-X Mi Mw P-X
Grains 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.22 -0.05 -0.16 0.21 0.04 -0.25 0.17 -0.04 -0.13
OthAgr 0.25 -0.12 -0.14 0.23 -0.11 -0.13 2.42 -0.95 -1.48 0.25 -0.11 -0.14
Livestock 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.09 -0.03 -0.06 0.42 -0.06 -0.36 0.07 -0.02 -0.05
Extraction 0.42 -0.05 -0.36 0.67 -0.33 -0.34 3.62 -2.54 -1.08 0.64 -0.28 -0.36
Food 0.14 -0.04 -0.10 0.24 -0.09 -0.14 0.91 -0.14 -0.77 0.23 -0.08 -0.14
Cloth 0.21 -0.03 -0.18 0.13 -0.03 -0.09 2.84 -0.88 -1.96 0.18 -0.04 -0.14
Transp 1.73 -0.59 -1.13 1.48 -0.60 -0.87 9.21 -7.70 -1.51 1.64 -0.66 -0.98
Mach 1.45 -0.56 -0.89 0.41 -0.12 -0.30 4.48 -3.45 -1.03 0.66 -0.23 -0.44
OthMnf 0.89 -0.32 -0.57 0.20 -0.07 -0.13 5.35 -2.80 -2.55 0.44 -0.16 -0.27
Svces 0.00 0.05 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.15 -0.14 0.00 0.02 -0.02
Total 0.41 -0.11 -0.30 0.17 -0.06 -0.11 1.50 -0.66 -0.83 0.25 -0.08 -0.17
     /1: this table reflects the difference between the PRF and the MFN simulations.
The apparent consumption analysis netting out the effects exclusive to Mercosur allows one to see
a common pattern in all members of the bloc. Firstly, by separating the preferential from the MFN effect,
it is possible to infer that most of the increase in the share of intra-bloc imports in the PRF experiment
was actually due to the bloc formation (table 13). In general, about two-thirds of the increase in the share
of total intra-bloc imports in apparent consumption in each member of the bloc was due to the bloc effect,
and only one-third to the non-discriminatory liberalization. Transport equipment is the sector with the
major reorientation in trade and production patterns among all members of the bloc. The most impressive
change in this sector occurred in Uruguay, where the share of intra-bloc imports in apparent consumption
went up by 9.21 percentage points to the detriment of imports from outside the bloc and domestic
production. Secondly, because of the bloc formation, the shares of extra-bloc imports became lower than
they would have been if liberalization on a MFN basis had been followed. In Uruguay, for instance,
transport equipment and machinery registered a decrease in the share of extra-bloc imports that reached
7.7 and 3.5 percentage points, respectively, by far the sectors in which the regional approach influenced
most negatively imports from abroad. Thirdly, the share of domestic production also declined further due
to Mercosur, when compared with a situation with a non-discriminatory liberalization. The reduction in
the share of domestic production in apparent consumption went down more intensively in Uruguay,
where the total share declined almost a percentage point more than it would do under the MFN scenario.
This situation shows that when unilateral measures undertaken under the MFN principle are disregarded,
the real effect of the bloc seems to be much less welfare improving than the PRF simulation would have
predicted.
Table 14: Mercosur Effect on Value of Apparent Consumption (1995 US$ million) 
/1
ARG BRA URY MERC
Sectors Mi Mw P-X Mi Mw P-X Mi Mw P-X Mi Mw P-X
Grains 0 0 0 28 -6 -21 1 0 -1 29 -6 -22
OthAgr 41 -19 -22 128 -58 -70 16 -6 -10 182 -82 -100
L i v e s t o c k 0 1- 12 4- 9 - 1 5 7- 1- 63 1- 8 - 2 3
Extraction 60 -8 -53 258 -128 -131 26 -18 -8 345 -152 -193
Food 81 -25 -57 260 -102 -158 33 -5 -28 389 -146 -243
Cloth 63 -9 -54 73 -19 -54 22 -7 -15 160 -33 -127
Transp 412 -142 -270 680 -277 -399 65 -54 -11 1,157 -468 -689
Mach 300 -115 -185 324 -96 -236 44 -34 -10 672 -230 -442
OthMnf 838 -302 -536 521 -174 -347 210 -110 -100 1,576 -592 -984
Svces 5 81 -86 -36 63 -96 0 24 -22 -25 216 -192
Total 1,810 -490 -1,320 2,333 -846 -1,487 439 -195 -244 4,638 -1,550 -3,088
/1: this table reflects the difference between the PRF and the MFN simulations.14
Although changes in the shares of the three sources of supply in apparent consumption in most
sectors seem to be quite small, when they are expressed in face value the picture changes, reflecting the
high value assumed by apparent consumption, notably in Brazil (table 14). Considering the bloc as a
whole, the results suggests that the increase in intra-bloc imports attributed exclusively to Mercosur
reached US$ 4,638 million, of which approximately one-third occurred at expense of non-member
imports (US$ 1,550 million) and two-thirds at the cost of domestic production. It is noteworthy that other
manufactures and transport equipment accounts for more than half of the reduction in the value of bloc
imports from non-member countries.
Table 15: Mercosur Effect on Allocative Efficiency (1995 US$ million) 
/1
Sector Arg Bra Ury NAFTA EU Andean Asean ROW Total
Grains 2 14 0 -2 -9 0 -3 2 5
OthAgr -1 146 0 -3 -4 0 0 3 140
Livestock 0 6 1 0 -4 0 0 -1 1
Extraction 1 11 1 -1 0 -1 0 -6 5
Food 3 63 5 -3 -53 -1 0 -8 7
C l o t h - 1 1 1 - 3 - 1 - 100 - 14
Transp -22 -19 -4 -2 -4 0 -4 -4 -60
Mach -5 82 -1 -1 -2 -1 -2 -2 67
OthMnf -10 157 2 -5 -7 -1 -2 -14 119
S v c e s 36 - 240012 1 5
Total -30 476 0 -14 -86 -4 -10 -30 302
     /1: this table reflects the difference between the PRF and the MFN simulations.
The previous analysis suggested that Mercosur was responsible for a sharp increase in the share of
apparent consumption expenditure coming from intra-bloc imports, along with a marked decline in the
share of both extra-bloc imports and domestic production. On the one hand, the bloc could have improved
efficiency since the inefficient domestic producers were replaced by imports coming from other partners.
On the other hand, the most efficient producers located outside the bloc could have lost market access due
to preferences granted to intra-bloc trade. It is noteworthy that only Brazil experiences a net allocative
efficiency gain caused by Mercosur formation and even so it was quite small (table 15). While Uruguay
shows no allocative gains, all the remaining regions, including Argentina, face a decline in allocative
efficiency. In other words, allocative gains experienced under the PRF experiment stemmed from
unilateral rather than regional liberalization, with only Brazil marginally improving its welfare gains. That
is to say, Mercosur brought about very small allocative gains for its members and losses for the outside
regions. As regards the sectors, in most regions allocative losses were usually concentrated in transport
equipment.










Arg -30 244 1 215 0.082%
Bra 476 76 21 573 0.081%
Ury 0 51 5 57 0.333%
NAFTA -14 -48 -31 -93 -0.001%
EU -86 -143 4 -224 -0.003%
Andean -4 -21 -1 -26 -0.011%
Asean -10 -49 4 -55 -0.001%
ROW -30 -114 -6 -150 -0.003%
Total 302 -3 -1 297 0.001%
 /1: this table reflects the difference between the PRF and the MFN simulations.15
The overall net welfare effect of Mercosur is extremely small, representing 0.001% of the world
GDP (table 16). More importantly, it benefits only the members of the bloc, especially Uruguay, which
presents an overall welfare gain of a third of a percentage point. It is noteworthy that overall welfare gains
obtained by Mercosur members, except Uruguay, stemming from regional integration are smaller to what
they would attain if they followed a non-discriminatory liberalization. Besides all remaining regions
outside the bloc suffer a welfare loss, specially the EU and the RoW. In other words, all member and non-
members countries, except Uruguay, would be better off if the multilateral liberalization were adopted.
4.4 Impact of CET: The Customs Union Experiment
As mentioned earlier, as far as import tariffs are concerned, the full implementation of the customs
union by 2006 is divided in two phases. Firstly, the intra-bloc tariffs were removed from 1991 to 1994.
Secondly, individual tariffs of all products will converge to the CET in 2006. The previous sections
addressed the effects of internal liberalization, while this section will deal exclusively with the impact of
implementation of the CET. The convergence to the CET takes place from a situation in which intra-bloc
trade faces no tariff restrictions and extra-bloc tariffs are set at their 1995 level, corresponding to the same
initial equilibrium as the ‘PRF experiment’. This will complete the analysis of expected effects of the bloc
on trade patterns and welfare of both members and non-members of Mercosur. The establishment of the
CET from the preferential situation in 1995 causes much less impact on trade and production patterns
than those observed under the previous simulations, where both internal and external tariffs were
disturbed. This is not surprising, since in 1995 intra-bloc import tariffs were already eliminated and tariffs
applied on imports from third countries were much more similar to the final CET, when compared with
changes in tariffs observed between 1991 and 1995. The outcome, as usual, depends on the direction and
intensity of changes in tariffs.
Table 17:  Mercosur Effect on Share of Apparent Consumption (%)
ARG BRA URY MERC
Sectors Mi Mw P-X Mi Mw P-X Mi Mw P-X Mi Mw P-X
Grains 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 -0.26 0.19 0.09 -0.18 0.09 0.05 -0.20 0.14
OthAgr -0.04 0.08 -0.05 -0.04 0.16 -0.12 -0.24 0.56 -0.32 -0.04 0.15 -0.11
Livestock 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.12 -0.18 -0.01 0.03 -0.02
Extraction -0.11 0.50 -0.39 -0.23 1.16 -0.92 -1.42 1.75 -0.33 -0.21 0.99 -0.77
Food 0.03 -0.09 0.06 0.04 -0.17 0.14 0.19 -0.36 0.16 0.04 -0.15 0.11
Cloth 0.19 -0.55 0.35 0.17 -0.76 0.59 2.47 -4.37 1.90 0.20 -0.72 0.52
Transp 0.91 -1.39 0.49 -0.35 0.72 -0.37 16.22 -16.40 0.18 0.24 -0.17 -0.08
Mach 0.50 -1.16 0.66 -0.09 1.05 -0.96 4.32 -5.41 1.09 0.08 0.54 -0.62
OthMnf -0.18 0.64 -0.46 -0.04 0.38 -0.34 -1.00 1.60 -0.61 -0.09 0.46 -0.37
Svces 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.02
Total 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.13 -0.11 0.47 -0.47 0.00 0.00 0.08 -0.09
      Source: GTAP CET simulation.
The convergence to the CET causes a rise in extra-bloc tariffs applied on manufactures and a
decline in extra-bloc tariffs on agricultural products in Argentina and Uruguay. Therefore, there is a clear
pattern in these two countries marked by an increase in volume of intra-bloc imports at the expense of
imports from outside the bloc in manufactures, while the opposite occurs with agricultural sectors. The
rise in protectionism in manufactures in Argentina and Uruguay led to an increase in the share of intra-
bloc imports and domestic production in apparent consumption at the expense of extra-bloc imports in
these two countries (table 17). Meanwhile, the more liberal tariff policy towards non-member countries in
primary sectors results in an increase in the share of imports from non-member countries to the detriment
of domestic production and intra-bloc imports. That is to say, the situation in manufactures corresponds to
external trade diversion and external trade erosion, while it corresponds to external trade creation and
internal trade diversion in agricultural sectors, with the former much more likely to cause welfare
allocative losses. Brazil, in turn, needed to reduce its tariffs in most sectors to achieve the CET, which16
brought about an increase in the share of extra-bloc imports at the cost of the shares of both domestic
production and internal imports, suggesting once more that it is the member of the bloc with the highest
chance of benefiting from allocative efficiency gains.
This is confirmed when the allocative efficiency analysis is performed allowing one to see that, as
already occurred in previous simulations, Brazil is the country that benefit most from changes in trade
policy (table 18). Most commodity groups present allocative gains except those in which the level of
protection was raised, notably clothing. However, as the size of changes in distortions is much smaller,
the impact on welfare is also not as significant as it was under the previous experiments. As expected,
most manufactures in Argentina and Uruguay face allocative losses due to the rise in tariffs, especially
transport equipment, while agricultural sectors experience efficiency gains provoking an overall
allocative loss for these two countries. The total impact associated with the efficiency effect reaches US$
1,024 million, with all outside regions benefiting from allocative gains.
Table 18: Decomposition of Regional Allocative Efficiency (1995 US$ million)
Sector Arg Bra Ury NAFTA EU Andean Asean ROW Total
Grains 3 -14 0 4 11 0 3 -1 7
O t h A g r 1 1 3 503300 - 4 1 3 8
L i v e s t o c k 020160009
E x t r a c t i o n 5 5 714510 1 3 8 7
Food -5 -29 -2 4 56 0 2 9 36
Cloth -21 -123 -9 -1 -4 0 -1 -12 -170
Transp -45 69 -12 0 2 1 -1 3 18
M a c h - 2 8 3 2 4 - 533336 3 0 8
OthMnf 80 434 6 16 16 3 0 26 581
S v c e s 0 - 3 - 1 - 17025 1 0
Total -9 852 -22 33 107 8 8 46 1,024
     Source: GTAP CET simulation.
The results of the change in aggregate welfare for Brazil are positive, since losses caused by
deterioration of its terms of trade and price of savings are not large enough to outweigh efficiency gains.
In Argentina, terms of trade losses reinforce efficiency losses leading to an overall fall in welfare, while
in Uruguay the slight improvement in terms of trade is insufficient to reverse allocative losses, also
provoking an aggregate welfare loss (table 19). Welfare gains obtained by the outside regions are
concentrated in the improvement in their terms of trade, with the EU showing the largest increase in this
component. In general, as already happened with the allocative effect, the size of changes in the terms of
trade is smaller when compared with those observed between 1991 and 1995 for all regions. As a result,
overall aggregate welfare gains reach US$ 1,021 million, corresponding to 0.004% of world GDP.









Arg -9 -86 0 -96 -0.037%
Bra 852 -446 -89 318 0.045%
Ury -22 10 5 -7 -0.041%
NAFTA 33 125 33 191 0.002%
EU 107 135 12 255 0.003%
Andean 8 35 1 44 0.019%
Asean 8 66 19 93 0.002%
ROW 46 159 19 224 0.004%
Total 1,024 -2 0 1,021 0.004%
     Source: GTAP CET simulation.17
After isolating the effects of the bloc from the unilateral tariff reduction and estimating the effects
of the implementation of the CET, it is possible to infer the contribution of each of these elements to the
overall effect of the bloc formation and the effect of the liberalization on a MFN basis. Figure 1 reports
the impact of each simulation performed in this paper on overall welfare as a share of 1995 GDP. As the
foregoing analysis suggested, the bulk of overall welfare gains in the period 1991-95 are due to the MFN
liberalization rather than the regional liberalization for all countries and regions except for Uruguay. It
can also be seen that most of welfare gains attributed to the bloc formation occurred during the transition
period for Mercosur members, as they removed intra-bloc tariffs and cut external tariffs. Argentina and
Uruguay actually experienced welfare losses due to the implementation of the CET in 2006. However,
due to welfare gains obtained during the transition period, Uruguay was the member of the bloc that most
benefited from regional integration in the whole period examined, with gains reaching 0.29% of its GDP.
Brazil comes second, being the only member of the bloc that benefits from regional integration in both
periods, while Argentina obtains gains only during the transition period. However, when the aggregate
welfare effects are considered, involving both the regional and the multilateral liberalization, Brazil was
the member that obtained the largest gains in the whole period, reaching 0.22% of its GDP.
Figure 1: Summary Effects of Simulations
Source: All simulations
However, the findings of this paper are potentially sensitive to the assumptions we have used,
especially the value of trade elasticities (e.g. Gehlhar, 1997; and Hertel and Martin, 1999). In order to
check the extent to which changes in these elasticities would affect welfare results, their values were
doubled and halved in the GTAP 4 database (table 20). The doubling of trade elasticities has the effect of
expanding allocative gains experienced by the countries, especially Brazil, where they almost doubled,
and dampening the terms of trade effect associated with tariff liberalization. Brazil emerges as the larger
beneficiary of this procedure, with its total welfare gains increasing to 0.85% of GDP while the world as a














































effects on allocative and terms of trade effects, with Brazil suffering welfare losses. Smaller trade
elasticities cause large terms of trade effects. As Argentina and Uruguay obtain their gains mainly form
changes in terms of trade, an interesting pattern occurs, since the halving of trade elasticities makes them
better off compared when they were doubled. Thus, the main consequence of changes in trade elasticities
is a redistribution of gains within the bloc, benefiting Brazil when they are increased, and Argentina and
Uruguay when they are reduced.









Doubling Halving Doubling Halving Doubling Halving Doubling Halving
Arg 0.01 0.16 -0.04 -0.04 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.22
Bra 0.10 0.06 0.19 -0.04 0.57 -0.28 0.85 -0.27
Ury 0.09 0.56 -0.17 0.07 -0.04 -0.21 -0.11 0.42
RoW 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Total 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01
Source: GTAP CET simulation.
5.  Conclusion
This paper performed two sets of simulations. The first set sought to measure the effective role
played by Mercosur in determining the effects on trade patterns and welfare caused by the elimination of
intra-bloc duties. The second inferred what would be the impact of the implementation of the CET in
2006. The ‘bloc effect’ on internal liberalization was estimated as being the difference between the actual
preferential liberalization (PRF experiment) and a hypothetical non-discriminatory liberalization where
the tariffs in 1995 would not be discriminatory (MFN experiment). This scenario serves as a
counterfactual to the actual changes in tariff policy, and the difference between the results of the PRF and
the MFN simulations reflects the effects that can be attributed exclusively to the bloc formation. This was
necessary since bloc members were involved in a unilateral tariff reform simultaneously with the
implementation of the regional agreement. The analysis focused mainly on the issue of trade diversion
and trade creation, relying on an apparent consumption analysis. The results were later compared with the
changes in welfare due to allocative efficiency effects.
The PRF experiment showed that Brazil experienced a situation characterized as internal and
external trade creation in most sectors where the shares of intra and extra-bloc imports increases at the
expense of domestic production. In Argentina and Uruguay, although the share of apparent consumption
expenditures coming from intra-bloc imports also expanded, it occurred to the detriment of both domestic
production and imports from outside the bloc. The fear of trade diversion was minimized, since the share
of domestic output declined, in most cases, more intensively than that of imports from third countries.
The welfare analysis based on the allocative efficiency effects of the simulation confirms that Brazil
benefited most from the experiment obtaining the largest welfare increase in most sectors. Argentina and
Uruguay faced almost no change in welfare due to the allocative effect, suggesting that the fears of trade
diversion did not show up at country level, although some sectors, like transport equipment, experienced
allocative losses in these two countries.
However, by netting out the bloc effects by removing the impact of the MFN scenario from the
PRF simulation it was possible to identify that the PRF experiment provides a poor approximation of the
real effect associated with the bloc formation, especially in Brazil where unilateral liberalization was
more vigorously pursued. Therefore, when the bloc effects were disentangled from the rest, the results in
terms of increases in extra-bloc imports and welfare are quite impressive. Although there was an increase
in allocative efficiency due to the bloc formation, it was very small when compared with the gains
generated by the liberalization on a MFN basis. In summary, most of the allocative gains experienced
under the PRF experiment stemmed from external rather than internal liberalization.19
Finally, the impact of the implementation of the CET was estimated starting from a scenario with
free trade within the bloc and the external tariffs as they were in 1995. The results from the ‘CET
experiment’ suggested that the implementation of the CET would reinforce the changes in shares in
apparent consumption, which occurred due to the regional liberalization in Argentina and Uruguay while
partially reversing the changes in Brazil. In Argentina and Uruguay there was a decline in aggregate
welfare, while Brazil and all other regions were better off. This results from the need to raise the
individual tariffs on extra-bloc imports in most commodity groups to match the level required by the CET
in Argentina and Uruguay. Meanwhile Brazil has to reduce its tariffs on non-member countries to reach
the CET levels, provoking an increase in the volume of imports from third countries along with a
reduction in imports from the other partners and in domestic production bringing about allocative gains.
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